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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Dilly Dilly!”1 The sound of exultation echoed throughout the halls of 
Anheuser-Busch as the California Senate passed AB 2573 in the autumn of 
2018.2 Before the bill traveled to the Governor’s desk, it appeared the national 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2021; B.A., 
Enterprise Regulation, St. John’s University, 2016. First, I want to thank my friends and family for the 
encouragement and love that cannot be taken for granted throughout this process. I would also like to thank the 
entire Law Review staff for their time and energy, my article would have been nothing without the hours spent 
editing and providing feedback. A special thanks to both Professor Daniel Croxall and Thomas Gerhart, a 
willingness to share your extensive knowledge and ideas were instrumental to the development of this article. 
Lastly, I want to thank all the mentors whose advice has guided me to this point in my life. 
1.  Bud Light, Bud Light: Dilly Dilly!, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9mGNhvkVT8Q (last visited 
Sept. 7, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
2.  See Daniel Croxall, The Glassware Bill is Dead: Good News for California Independent Craft Beer, 
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Goliath of beer succeeded in lobbying for another exception to California’s tied-
house laws.3 A tied-house is a retailer who is bound to a specific alcohol 
manufacturer for any reason.4 One argument the Temperance Movement made in 
their push for the prohibition of alcohol was the unbridled drinking that resulted 
from the proliferation of tied-houses.5 Following the repeal of Prohibition, new 
state laws sought to eliminate tied houses by creating separation between the 
tiers—manufacturing, distribution, and retail—of the alcohol industry.6 In 
contrast to the spirit of California’s three-tier system, AB 2573 would have 
allowed manufacturers to give branded glassware to retail outlets.7 However, 
Anheuser-Busch’s excitement was short-lived; Governor Jerry Brown vetoed AB 
2573.8 Governor Brown voiced concern for the economic disadvantage “small 
beer manufactures [sic]” would face because of an inability “to provide free 
glassware in the same manner as larger manufacturers.”9 
With a new governor in office, Assembly Member Evan Low introduced AB 
1133, a bill that was nearly identical to AB 2573.10 The law could greatly impact 
the growth of California’s independent, craft beer community by providing a 
 
CRAFT BEER LAW PROF (Sept. 11, 2018), https://www.craftbeerprofessor.com/2018/09/glassware-bill-dead-
good-news-california-independent-craft-beer/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting 
the bill sponsors—including Anheuser-Busch—and motivations which stem from both marketing and 
relationship building with the retail channels). 
3.  See Daniel Croxall, Ever Played Jenga? Too Many Exceptions to Tied-House Laws Render the Whole 
System Vulnerable, CRAFT BEER LAW PROF (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.craftbeerprofessor.com/2017/02/ever-
played-jenga-many-exceptions-tied-house-laws-render-whole-system-vulnerable/ (on file with The University of 
the Pacific Law Review) (explaining the “concerted effort out there to get rid of or to minimize tied-house laws 
[to] benefit big beer manufacturers [at] the detriment of craft breweries.”). 
4.  See Daniel Croxall, Let’s Make Sure We Are Talking About the Same Things: Tied-House Laws and 
the Three-Tier System, CRAFT BEER LAW PROF (Feb. 6, 2017), 
https://www.craftbeerprofessor.com/2017/02/lets-make-sure-talking-things-tied-house-laws-three-tier-system/ 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining a tied- house establishment as “any retail 
outlet that is beholden to a particular alcohol manufacturer for any reason”). 
5.  Bureau of Planning and Zoning Historic Pres. Div., City of Chicago, Landmark Designation Report: 
Five Schlitz Brewery Tied-Houses and One Schlitz Brewery Stable Building (Apr. 7, 2011), available at 
https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/zlup/Historic_Preservation/Publications/Five_Brewery_Tied_
Houses_and_One_Brewery_Stable.pdf (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review). 
6.  See Croxall, supra note 4 (describing the tied-house laws passed throughout the U.S. following 
prohibition that created the modern three-tier system). 
7.  See Cal. Beer Wholesalers Ass’n v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 5 Cal. 3d 402, 409 (Cal. 
1971) (en banc) (California’s establishment of a triple-tiered distribution and licensing scheme was the primary 
tool used to combat “evils and excesses as intemperance and disorderly marketing conditions that had plagued 
the public and the alcoholic beverage industry prior to prohibition”); AB 2573, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. 
(Cal. 2018) (as passed on Aug. 21, 2018, but not enacted). 
8.  Letter from Jerry Brown, Governor, Cal. State to Cal. State Assembly (Sept. 6, 2018) [hereinafter 
Brown Letter] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
9.  Id.  
10.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §25600.05 (enacted by Chapter 623); Phil Willon, Taryn Luna & Melanie 
Mason, Gavin Newsom sworn in as California’s 40th governor, L.A. Times (Jan. 7, 2019), 
https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-governor-gavin-newsom-inauguration-20190107-story.html (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
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benefit to large manufacturers who dominated the beer market for decades.11 
Manufacturers like Anheuser Busch and Coors—known as “Big Beer”—
experienced a loss in both market share and total volume since the rise of the 
craft brew sensation.12 To recapture what they lost, Big Beer companies 
diversified their portfolios to match changing consumer preferences and secure 
their place in this new and largely independent “craft” market.13 The efforts of 
the domestic Big Beer duopoly are beginning to pay off; studies show the growth 
rate of craft brewing is slowing down.14 The guaranteed success many 
independent brewers enjoyed due to tremendous market growth over the course 
of the last decade has passed.15 The industry is starting to experience market 
saturation because an ever growing number of independent breweries coupled 
with the large, efficient distribution channels of established manufacturers who 
are infiltrating the community.16 Chapter 623 should not have created another 
exception to California tied-house laws which allows Big Beer to use their 
financial strength overcome competition within the craft beer market.17 In 
 
11.  See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 
1133, at 3-4 (Apr. 3, 2019) (detailing concerns expressed by the California Craft Brewers Association over 
ability to maintain a fair marketplace in light of the proposed legislation); and Beth Newhart, US craft beer has 
settled into a ‘more mature growth pattern’, BEVERAGE DAILY, (Apr. 5, 2019) 
https://www.beveragedaily.com/Article/2019/04/05/US-craft-beer-market-has-settled-into-a-more-mature-
growth-pattern (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
12.  Compare Christopher Doering, Molson Coors Hurt by Weak US Demand, Softness in Beer Industry, 
FOOD DIVE (May 2, 2018) https://www.fooddive.com/news/molson-coors-hurt-by-weak-us-demand-softness-
in-beer-industry/522643/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (AB InBev, the international 
parent company of Anheuser Busch, and Molson Coors have lost a combined 13.4% share of the U.S. market 
since 2009), with Beer Volume Declines Continue, Despite Gains in Craft And Imported Brews, BEVERAGE 
INFO. GROUP (Oct. 10, 2018) https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/beer-volume-declines-continue-
despite-gains-in-craft-and-imported-brews-300727917.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (providing that American’s have consumed 1.1% less total beer volume in 2017 than 2016, the fifth 
consecutive year of decline). 
13.  See Craft vs. Crafty: A Statement From the Brewers Association, BREWER’S ASS’N (Dec. 6, 2012) 
https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/craft-vs-crafty-a-statement-from-the-brewers-association/ 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“[C]raft brewer is defined as small and independent. 
Their annual production is six million barrels of beer or less. . .if a large brewer has a controlling share of a 
smaller producing brewery, the brewer is, by definition, not craft.”). 
14.  See Newhart, supra note 11 (noting the growth of craft beer has slowed and led to more competition 
amongst brewers targeting this market.), and MARIN INSTITUTE, BIG BEER DUOPOLY 5 (2009), available at 
https://alcoholjustice.org/images/reports/big_beer_duopoly.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (AB InBev and Molson Coors now have combined control of more 80% of the United States beer 
market). 
15.  See Zach Fowle, This is Why My Brewery Shut Down, DRAFT MAG., https://draftmag.com/this-is-
why-my-brewery-shut-down/ 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing studies which show that since 2014 the 
number of new breweries that open annually is decreasing, while the number of closures is increasing). 
16.  Rachel Siegel, The Craft Beer Industry’s Buzz is Wearing Off, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/business/wp/2018/04/10/the-craft-beer-industrys-buzz-is-wearing-
off/?noredirect=on (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
17.  See Rachel Arthur, AB InBev on Craft and Specialty Beer: ‘The High End is the #1 Growth Engine of 
Our Company,’ BEVERAGEDAILY.COM (MAR. 5, 2019), 
https://www.beveragedaily.com/Article/2019/03/05/AB-InBev-on-craft-and-specialty-beer-The-High-End-is-
2020 / California’s Tied-House Laws 
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comparison to macro breweries, independent breweries cannot afford to provide 
equivalent value to retailers, which leaves Big Beer free to flood the market with 
their branding.18 Worse yet, this “pay-to-play” law will cost California taxpayers 
approximately one million dollars annually.19 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In order to better understand the impacts of Chapter 623, it is important to 
understand the history of California’s tied-house laws.20 Section A details why 
these laws were first enacted.21 Following, Section B offers other examples of 
erosion to the general law through previously adopted exceptions.22 
A. California’s Tied-House: General Rules 
In his 1932 campaign, Franklin D. Roosevelt promised to repeal the 
Eighteenth Amendment, a national ban on the sale and consumption of alcohol.23 
After his convincing victory, the end of America’s experiment with Prohibition 
was clear.24 In response, California started to draft preliminary laws that would 
govern the reemerging alcohol industry.25 The work resulted in California’s 
enactment of the State Liquor Control Act in June of 1933; the laws would 
become effective once Prohibition ended.26 Shortly before Roosevelt took office 
in the Spring of 1933, Congress proposed the Twenty-First Amendment.27 By 
December, Utah delivered the thirty-sixth and final vote necessary to ratify a 
constitutional amendment.28 The amendment allowed individual states to 
establish their own laws to govern the production and sale of alcohol.29 With 
 
our-growth-engine (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (acknowledging that AB InBev is 
pointed in their pursuit to continue to grow and maintain a position as “number one craft beer brewer in the 
world”). 
18.  Interview with Evan Rosatelli, Head Brewer, Union Brewing Company, in Sacramento, Cal. (Aug. 4, 
2019). 
19.  ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1133, at 1 (Feb. 21, 
2019); Brown Letter, supra note 8. 
20.  See Prohibition, HIST. (Oct. 29, 2009), https://www.history.com/topics/roaring-twenties/prohibition 
(on file with The University of Pacific Law Review) (explaining that individual states were responsible for the 
production and sales of alcohol which California achieved through enactment of statutes which prevented tied 
houses, amongst other things). 
21.  Infra Section II.A. 
22.  Infra Section II.B. 
23.  Prohibition, HIST., supra note 20. 
24.  Id. 
25.  See 1933 Cal. Stat. ch. 658, § 39 at 1707 (effective “when it shall become lawful under the 
Constitution and the laws of the United States to manufacture, sell, . . . intoxicating liquors”). 
26.  See 1933 Cal. Stat. ch. 658, § 39 at 1707. (obtaining governor’s authorization in June of 1933). 
27.  Prohibition, HIST., supra note 20. 
28.  Id. 
29.  See U.S. CONST. amend. X (establishing that powers that are not federally held are reserved to the 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51 
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preliminary legislation already in place, the California Legislature began drafting 
a more comprehensive body of law that would become the Alcohol Beverage 
Control Act.30 
Within two years of the Twenty-Frist Amendment’s ratification, the 
California Legislature passed a complete set of laws to govern the alcohol 
industry—the Alcohol Beverage Control Act.31 Its words remain the heart of 
California’s modern tied-house laws.32 Provisions which expressly prohibit the 
vertical and horizontal integration limit relationships within industry to protect 
against the danger of tied-houses that existed prior to their enactment.33 The law 
requires distributors, manufacturers, and retailers do not have any ownership 
interest in one another.34 Further, tied-house laws forbid any one of the tiers from 
inducing decisions of a company in a different tier through the giving of things of 
value.35 
Eighteen years after its creation, the Alcohol Beverage Control Act 
transitioned into its current position within the Business and Professional Code.36 
This move was due to a major reorganization all of California’s laws.37 The law 
remained substantively the same when it shifted into the newly organized 
statutory scheme.38 Chapter 623 will add and repeal a section of this body of 
law.39 
B. Exceptions to the Rule 
Although the Business and Professions Code created a distinct three-tier 
 
states) and U.S. CONST. amend. XXI (providing transportation or importation of alcohol into any state “in 
violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited”) . 
30.  See Thomas A. Gerhart, Undermining the Law: How Uninformed Legislating Helps Big Beer Erode 
California’s Tied-House Laws, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 26, 31, (2019). 
31.  1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 330, § 1. 
32.  See id. (establishing laws which create a three-tier system to regulate the manufacture and sale of 
alcohol), and CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 25500–25600 (West 2018) (adopting the language of California’s 
original tied-house law within a new statutory construct). 
33.  Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh, 830 F.2d 957, 959 (9th Cir. 1986 ) (Noting that “(t)he provision was enacted 
. . . as part of California’s “tied-house” statutes . . . to prevent large-scale manufacturers and wholesalers of 
alcoholic beverages from dominating local markets for their products through vertical and horizontal 
integration”.) 
34.  1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 330, § 54(a) at 1148. 
35.  Id. 
36.  See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25500 (West 2018) (noting that California codified its general tied-
house restrictions in the Business and Professional Code in 1953). 
37.  Ralph N. Kleps, The Revision and Codification of California Statutes 1849-1953, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 
766, 793 (1954). 
38.  Compare 1935 Cal. Stat. ch. 330, § 54(a)–(b) at 1148 (The earliest example of California law that 
expressly prohibits a manufacturer from holding ownership or providing money or things of value to a retailer), 
with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §25500(a)(2) (West 2018) (The modern equivalent of California’s original 
statute which creates independent tiers and prohibits ownership or influence over one another). 
39.  BUS. & PROF. §25600.05 (enacted by Chapter 623). 
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system, tied-house laws now contain nearly forty exceptions to the general rule.40 
Individual, fact-based situations led to a number of narrowly-applied 
exceptions.41 For example, a manufacturer may provide courses of instruction for 
licensees and their employees and instructional tastings for consumers at no 
cost.42 Another exception within the statute allows a manufacturer to directly 
provide support to retailers following a government-declared natural disaster.43 
Additionally, numerous exceptions to the general rule allow a manufacturer to 
purchase advertising space from a retailer.44 Each one of these exceptions are an 
example of the erosion to California’s tied-house laws that benefit beer 
manufacturers by strengthening their relationship with retailers.45 Other 
exceptions to California’s tied-house laws not only dictate a manufacturer’s 
actions but can also affect the activities of retailers.46 One example allows a 
retailer to hold diminutive ownership in a manufacturer’s company, so long as it 
is publicly traded.47 Likewise, a manufacturer can also own stock in a retailer, but 
the exception goes beyond passive ownership and permits a manufacturer to 
serve on a retailer’s board of directors.48 In both cases, the owner must report 
their position or stock interest to California Department of Alcoholic Beverage 
Control (“ABC”).49 These and many more of exceptions to California’s tied-
house laws are the results of private lobbying efforts of corporations looking to 
benefit by decreasing competition via consolidation.50 
 
40.  James M. Seff & Carrie L. Bonnington, A General Introduction to Alcohol Beverage Laws and 
Regulations, ASPATORE (Dec. 2015) (West). 
41.  California Tied-House Restrictions and Exceptions, WINE LAW DECANTED (Feb. 8, 2012), 
http://winelawdecanted.com/?p=399 (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review). 
42.  See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.5 (West 2018) (“A winegrower, beer manufacturer . . . may, 
without charge . . . conduct courses of instruction for licensees and their employees, on the subject of wine or 
beer.”); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.55(a)–(b) (West 2018) (“A beer manufacturer . . . may instruct 
consumers or conduct courses of instruction for consumers . . . instruction of consumers regarding beer may 
include the furnishing of tastes.”). 
43.  See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25511 (West 2018) (suspending the inducement ban on 
manufacturers to allow them to provide equipment and supplies other than alcoholic beverages to a retailer 
whose equipment was damaged during a government-declared natural disaster). 
44.  See generally CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 25503.6, 25503.8, 25503.23, 25503.26 (creating fact 
specific situations in which manufacturers can sponsor or publicly advertise at an event on location of a retailer 
provided products from other manufacturers are also available for purchase at the event). 
45.  See Croxall, supra note 3 (hypothesizing that a “multitude of exceptions tends to lessen the 
government’s ability to argue that the law must be upheld because the interests it serves are so important”). 
46.  See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.12 (West 2018) (providing that a retailer can have ownership 
interest in other tiers of the alcohol industry). 
47.  Id. 
48.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25503.11 (West 2018). 
49.  CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 25503.11–12 (West 2018). 
50.  See Croxall, supra note 4 (commenting that tied-house laws were put in place to prevent the anti-
competitive nature of tied houses but the laws are “under attack through sophisticated lobbying efforts” of large 
manufacturers). 
The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 51 
233 
IV. CHAPTER 623 
Chapter 623 changes prior tied-house law by adding and repealing language 
within the Business and Professions Code.51 Chapter 623 creates a new exception 
to California’s laws that prohibit a manufacturer from giving items of value to a 
licensee.52 The new law provides a beer manufacturer the opportunity to furnish 
up to five cases of glassware to retail outlets.53 The narrow exception limits a 
retailer’s use by only permitting a retailer to accept up to ten cases of glassware 
annually.54 Further, a retailer may not attempt to otherwise benefit from the 
acceptance of glassware because its utilization is strictly limited to onsite 
commercial use.55 A case of glassware is defined as “twenty-four individual 
pieces of glassware intended for beer consumption.”56 
The new law also provides a procedural framework overseeing a 
manufacturer’s giving of glassware to retailers.57 A manufacturer may not give 
cases of glassware under conditions which suggest a tacit agreement to start or 
continue to purchase product.58 Additionally, Chapter 623 requires retail 
licensees to keep three years of records of all glassware they receive from a 
manufacturer.59 It also requires manufacturers to file similar records with 
California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (ABC) within thirty days 
of delivery.60 
Apart from manufacturers and retailers, Chapter 623 requires distributors—
the middle tier of California’s three-tier system—to play no role in utilizing the 
narrow exception.61 Distributors shall not, directly or indirectly, contribute to the 
cost of glassware manufacturers provide to a retailer—including transportation, 
delivery, or storing the glassware.62 Lastly, Chapter 623 includes a sunset 
provision which automatically repeals the law on January 1, 2023 unless the 
 
51.  BUS. & PROF. CODE §25600.05 (enacted by Chapter 623). 
52.  Compare id (providing an opportunity for manufacturers to give a limited number of glassware to 
retailers); with CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 25600(a)(1) (West 2019) (prohibiting a manufacturer from 
giving “any premium, gift, or free goods in connection with the sale or distribution of any alcoholic beverage”). 
53.  Bus. & Prof. §25600.05 (enacted by Chapter 623). 
54.  Id. 
55.  Id. 
56.  See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION ANALYSIS OF AB 1133, at 1 (Apr. 
3 2019) (defining “‘case’ to mean a box containing up to twenty-four pieces of glassware and ‘glassware’ to 
mean a single-service glass container or non-glass container capable of holding no more than twenty-three 
ounces of liquid volume”). 
57.  See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION ANALYSIS OF AB 1133, at 1 (Apr. 
3, 2019) (summarizing the procedural requirements of utilizing the substantive exception to the general tied-
house laws which prohibit transfer of value amongst the tiers of the alcohol industry). 
58.  BUS. & PROF. CODE §25600.05 (enacted by Chapter 623). 
59.  Id. 
60.  Id. 
61.  Id. 
62.  Id. 
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legislature takes action to extend the law.63 
V. ANALYSIS 
Criticism of Chapter 623 largely stemmed from concern over further erosion 
of California’s tied-house laws because the creation of another exception to the 
general rule.64 The motivation for the change is concerning; a major goal of tied-
house laws is to prevent aggressive marketing by large manufacturers, yet 
Chapter 623’s primary sponsor is Anheuser-Busch, one of the largest beer 
producers in the world.65 An analysis of Big Beer’s contemporary business 
practices sheds light on their intention in supporting this bill and the desired 
effect it could have on California’s independent brewers.66 Section A details the 
current efforts Big Beer employs to retain their place at the top of the beer 
industry.67 Section B explores the reality of whether manufacturers big and small 
will benefit from the new law.68 Section C will cover the cost of implementation 
and management of the exception in light of the limited budget provided to 
ABC.69 
A. Pay-to-Play: Big Beer’s Response to the Growth of the Craft Beer Market 
The total consumption of beer has declined in the U.S. for the previous five 
years.70 While the alcohol industry as a whole experienced a drop in total 
volume, beer continues to suffer the greatest loss.71 Throughout the same period, 
 
63.  Id. 
64.  See Brown Letter, supra note 8; and ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, 
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1133, at 4 (Apr. 3, 2019) (demonstrating concern over the ability to maintain a 
fair marketplace for beer in accord with the purpose of tied-house laws). 
65.  See Cal. Beer Wholesalers Ass’n 5 Cal. at 407 (finding a major purpose of tied-house law to be the 
prevention of negative influence of overly aggressive marketing techniques by large alcohol manufacturers); see 
also ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1133, at 4 
(Apr. 3, 2019) (listing Anheuser-Busch, a subsidiary of AB InBev, as only group in support of proposed 
legislation). 
66.  See Arthur, supra note 17 (detailing the growth opportunities targeted by Anheuser-Busch’s parent 
company, AB InBev); see also Oishimaya Sen Nag Which State Has The Most Craft Breweries?, WORLDATLAS 
(Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/top-us-craft-beer-producing-states.html (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (identifying California as the state with the most breweries at 764, double 
that of Washington, with the second most at 369). 
67.  Infra Section IV.A. 
68.  Infra Section IV.B. 
69.  Infra Section IV.C. 
70.  See Beer Volume Declines Continue, BEVERAGE INFO. GROUP supra note 12 (providing that 
American’s have consumed 1.1% less beer by total volume in 2017 than 2016, the fifth consecutive year of 
decline). 
71.  See Sharon Bailey, Why is Beer Losing Ground to Wine and Spirits? (Mar. 27, 2015), 
https://marketrealist.com/2015/03/beer-losing-ground-wine-spirits/ (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (explaining that beer’s total market share has decreased from 56% in 1999 to 48% in 2014 with 
the largest changes taking place within the light beer category). 
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the craft beer industry continues to grow, albeit at a slower pace than years past.72 
In 2008, the United States had nearly 1,500 brewers, growing to 5,000 by the end 
of 2016, and surpassing 7,000 breweries by 2019.73 This consistent economic 
growth within craft beer supports an astonishing number of breweries opening 
annually with minimal closings each year.74 Over the same period of time, the 
Big Beer’s volume of flagship products has greatly diminished.75 In its mid-year 
2017 earnings, Anheuser Busch acknowledged that Budweiser lost 0.4% and Bud 
Light lost 0.9% of its stock value in the second quarter of 2017.76 The changing 
tastes of American consumers provided craft beer the opportunity to claim a 
significant share of the domestic beer market.77 As consumers continue to trade-
up to high-end brands, America’s biggest brewers are changing their course to 
protect stakeholder’s interests.78 This trend has put immense pressure on 
companies like Anheuser-Busch to make changes to their business to retain their 
 
72.  See Beer Volume Declines Continue, BEVERAGE INFO. GROUP supra note 12 (noting that the craft 
beer segment grew 4.9% in 2017; less than the 6.0% recorded for the two years prior). 
73.  See Brad Tuttle, America Now Has a Record-High 5,000 Breweries and Counting, FORTUNE 
(Dec.10, 2016), https://fortune.com/2016/12/10/america-record-number-breweries/ (on file with The University 
of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing that the number of breweries in operation near the end of 2016 had grown 
to over 5,000); see also Justin Kendall, 7,000 Breweries to Operate in U.S. in 2018, BREWBOUND (Sept. 7, 
2018), https://www.brewbound.com/news/7000-breweries-operate-u-s-2018 (on file with The University of the 
Pacific Law Review) (reporting that the number of breweries has continued to grow to over 7,000 in 2018). 
74.  Brewers Association Releases Annual Growth Report, BREWERS ASS’N (Apr. 2, 2019), 
https://www.brewersassociation.org/press-releases/brewers-association-releases-annual-growth-report/ (on file 
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that craft beer growth has remained relatively 
consistent, showcased by 1,049 new breweries opening with only 219 closures in 2018). 
75. See Christopher Doering, Big Beer Struggles to Tap into Shifting Consumer Trends, FOOD DIVE (Apr. 
26, 2018), https://www.fooddive.com/news/big-beer-struggles-to-tap-into-shifting-consumer-trends/522213/ 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that overall sales have declined, but are “led 
by sharp drops among flagship products including Budweiser (-6.8%), Coors Light (-4.1%), Miller Lite (-2.8%) 
and the most popular U.S. brand, Bud Light (-5.7%)”). 
76.  See Dave Eisenberg & Bryan Roth, Anheuser-Busch InBev Lays Off Hundreds of “High End” 
Employees GOOD BEER HUNTING (Sept. 7, 2017), 
https://www.goodbeerhunting.com/sightlines/2017/9/7/anheuser-busch-inbev-the-high-end-layoffs (on file with 
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (considering the challenges which face Anheuser-Busch in balancing 
a market which has massive, yet declining sales in the core products with the growing portfolio of high-end 
beverages) and Chad Langager, What Is a Basis Point (BPS)? INVESTOPEDIA.COM (May 22, 2019) 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/what-basis-point-bps/ (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review) (explaining 1 basis point is the equivalent of 0.01% percentage change in the value of a financial 
instrument.) 
77.  See Cathy Siegner, Report: U.S. Beer Volume Has Declined for 5 Years Straight, FOOD DIVE (Oct. 
11, 2018), https://www.fooddive.com/news/report-us-beer-volume-has-declined-for-5-years-straight/539395/ 
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting that U.S. beer drinkers have been moving away 
from domestic lagers and turning to craft beers, Mexican imports and wine and spirits); see also Brewers 
Association Releases Annual Growth Report, BREWERS ASS’N, supra note 74 (noting that both percentage of 
market volume and market sales have increased for craft beer to 13.2% and 24.1% respectively). 
78.  See Third Quarter 2018 Results, AB INBEV (Oct. 25, 2018), available at https://www.ab-
inbev.com/content/dam/universaltemplate/ab-inbev/investors/reports-and-filings/quaterly-
reports/2018/10/AB%20InBev%203Q18%20Results%20Presentation%20-%20FINAL.pdf (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining AB InBev’s success in increasing revenue by 1.8% even 
though total volume decreased 0.5% due to a focus on premiumization of the market). 
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place atop a multi-billion-dollar market.79 
To tap into the growing craft brew market, Big Beer diversified its 
products.80 Their approach is twofold; by creating brands that consumers 
associate with craft beer and acquiring already successful, previously 
independent breweries.81 Both Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors have 
successfully leveraged their distribution and production capabilities to deliver 
“craft” beer to consumers with greater efficiency.82 This increased efficiency 
allows large manufacturers to sell at prices below market value or take a larger 
profit margin than would be available to an independent brewer.83 
Anheuser-Busch provides an example of the different ways Big Beer seeks to 
protect its dominance in both the traditional and growing craft beer market for 
years to come.84 Since 2011, they have purchased ten independent breweries.85 
Although those involved in the beer industry may know, the general public is 
often unaware because consumers would have no obvious way to recognize the 
change.86 This practice allows the parent company to purchase a reputation 
within the niche market and capitalize on the growth of an industry which would 
otherwise threaten Big Beer’s products.87 In addition to buying companies, large 
 
79.  See Arthur, supra note 17 (AB InBev recognizing that the craft and specialty divisions are essential 
to their growth plans). 
80.  See Dave Royse, ‘They’ve Got To Diversify’: Anheuser-Busch Buys Liquor, Canned Cocktail 
Company Cutwater, BENZINGA (Feb. 26, 2019, 10:48am), https://www.benzinga.com/analyst-ratings/analyst-
color/19/02/13237755/theyve-got-to-diversify-anheuser-busch-buys-liquor-cann (on file with The University of 
Pacific Law Review) (explaining that Anheuser-Busch recognizes that due to premiumization, current growth 
opportunity is in the high end, craft beer market). 
81.  See Matt Phillips, America’s Fastest-growing “Craft” Beer is Made by the World’s Biggest Brewer, 
QUARTZ (Feb. 28, 2014), https://qz.com/182269/americas-fastest-growing-craft-beer-is-made-by-the-largest-
beer-entity-on-earth/ (on file with The University of Pacific Law Review) (observing Shocktop was created by 
AB InBev in 2006 as a response to Coors’ Blue Moon); see also Dave Infante, Biggest Brewer Killed the Craft 
Beer Buzz, MEDIUM (Mar. 21, 2019), https://medium.com/s/story/how-the-worlds-biggest-brewer-killed-the-
craft-beer-buzz-e205a28ff632 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating that AB InBev 
has purchased ten independent breweries over the course of six years, making them the biggest “craft beer” 
company in the world). 
82.  See Infante, supra note 81 (noting that AB InBev can still make the same beer for a subsidiary 
company but will greatly increase profit margins because their extensive resources related to packaging, 
advertising, and shipping). 
83.  See Daniel Croxall, The Starve Out, CRAFT BEER LAW PROF (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.craftbeerprofessor.com/2018/11/the-starve-out/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (estimating that big beer is able to produce the “same beer” for up to twenty dollars less than an 
independent brewer). 
84.  See generally Adam Oakley, Welcome to the High End, AB INBEV (2013), available at 
https://www.ab-inbev.com/content/dam/universaltemplate/ab-inbev/investors/presentations-pdf-
archive/presentations/2013/13_Adam_Oakley-HighEnd.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law 
Review) (showcasing the opportunity AB InBev saw over 5 years ago for the growth of a market which 
threatened their profits). 
85.  See Infante, supra note 81  (pointing to the multiple purchases AB InBev has made since 2011 
including Goose Island, 10 Barrel, and Wicked Weed). 
86.  See id. (exposing AB InBev’s practice of using newly acquired companies as proxies to access the 
local, craft beer market). 
87.  See id. (explaining how acquisitions allow AB InBev to “compete directly with craft brewers on all 
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manufacturers are using the concept of “brewpubs” to exploit direct to consumer 
sales, a channel traditionally reserved for independent brewers.88 While these 
adopted techniques allow large manufacturers to infiltrate the “craft brew” 
market, they fail to meet the definition of craft brewer because of their large 
production volume.89 
Lobbying is another essential aspect of the U.S. duopoly’s commitment to 
maintain their status atop the beer industry.90 Large manufacturers seek changes 
in the law that create profitable opportunities, typically by adding exceptions to 
California’s tied-house laws.91 There are numerous exceptions that are directly 
attributable to Anheuser-Busch.92 Chapter 623 was the product of lobbying 
efforts for the same exception in two consecutive legislative cycles.93 Anheuser-
Busch’s ability to spend outrageous amounts of money to impact legislation 
illustrates the unfair playing field within the beer industry.94 Chapter 623 will 
provide another opportunity for Big Beer to use extensive capital to further its 
agenda and ultimately assist in the takeover of the craft beer industry.95 
B. Can Big Beer and Craft Manufacturers Both Benefit from Chapter 623? 
Chapter 623 provides that a manufacturer can give up to five cases of 
glassware to an individual retailer each year.96 While the limitation appears to 
 
the things that had brought drinkers to those breweries in the first place: from founders’ funky backstories, to 
community ties and grassroots aesthetics”). 
88.  See Nick Hines, Hop Take: AB InBev Is Done Buying Craft Breweries. Is That a Good Thing?, 
VINEPAIR (Sept. 14, 2017), https://vinepair.com/articles/ab-inbev-brewery-purchases/ (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing the plans for both 10 Barrel and Goldenroad, whom are both 
owned by AB InBev, to open brew pubs in Miami and Oakland respectively). 
89.  Craft vs. Crafty, BREWER’S ASS’N supra note 13. 
90.  See MARIN INSTITUTE, BIG BEER DUOPOLY, supra note 14 at 8 (showcasing that in 2008, A-B spent 
$3.46 million and MillerCoors spent over $2.5 million on lobbying expenditures on issues related to alcohol 
taxes, employment, and trade). 
91.  See generally Cal. Bus. Prof. Code §§25500-25600 (West 2018) (observing the vast number and 
types of exceptions to California’s tied-house laws). 
92.  See MARIN INSTITUTE, BIG BEER DUOPOLY, supra note 14 at 10 (examining the previous success 
Anheuser-Busch has seen when lobbying topics such as alcohol taxes, employment, and trade). 
93.  Compare ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF 
AB 1133, at 4 (Apr. 3, 2019), with SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, THIRD READING OF AB 2573, at 4 (Aug. 16, 
2018) (observing Anheuser-Busch was a sponsor on the submitted bill in both 2018 and 2019). 
94.  Compare See MARIN INSTITUTE, BIG BEER DUOPOLY, supra note 14 at 3  (presenting evidence of 
AB InBev using aggressive lobbying and political donations to expedite a potentially unfavorable merger and 
extorting governments by threatening jobs via closure if they experience tax increases) with Katie Green, 
Politics and Pale Ales: How Grassroots Activism, Lobbying, and Legislation Impacts the Craft Beer Industry, 
CRAFT BEER LAW PROF https://www.craftbeerprofessor.com/2018/11/craft-beer-law-student-article-katie-
green/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (detailing the “grassroots” mentality pervasive 
throughout craft beer and general unwillingness to engage in the same “pay to play” that Big Beer engage in). 
95.  See Croxall, supra note 2 (theorizing that Big Beer will be the only company capable of utilizing 
such an exception and have strongly advocated because they have a history of bullying their way to a desired 
result). 
96.  BUS. & PROF. CODE §25600.05 (enacted by Chapter 623). 
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prevent the aggressive marketing tied-house seeks to eliminate, there are more 
than 47,000 retailers throughout the state who would be eligible to receive the 
glassware.97 Chapter 623 provides manufacturers an opportunity to flood 
consumer marketplaces with their branding and is against the spirit of 
California’s tied-house laws.98 Beyond a potential conflict with law and its effect 
on consumers, Chapter 623 also disadvantages less-established manufacturers 
who cannot afford to purchase glassware for a prospective retailer.99 Chapter 623 
gives Big Beer manufacturers a chance to use their capital to dominate the 
advertising in a forum which has been closely regulated.100 This opportunity is 
beneficial in multiple ways—it provides a marketing opportunity to consumers 
and a chance to give value to its retailer.101 Many retailers, namely bars, operate 
on tight margins given the high overhead and revolving costs of owning such an 
establishment.102 As a result, many bar owners support changes to tied-house 
laws if they allow manufacturers provide obvious value to their business.103 
Although Chapter 623 prohibits such, bars may still choose to conduct business 
with the manufacturer who provides them with the greatest bottom-line value.104 
Big Beer can provide this material benefit to retailers they work with, but 
independent brewers will likely lose business unless they provide the same 
value.105 The added service will almost certainly influence a bar owner’s 
 
97.  ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1133, at 1 (Feb. 21, 
2019). 
98.  Compare Actmedia, Inc., 830 F.2d at 959 (tied-house laws were passed in part “to limit overly 
aggressive marketing techniques”) with Croxall, supra note 2  (hypothesizing that California retailers would be 
flooded with glassware from manufacturers with the deepest pockets). 
99.  See Croxall, supra note 2  (stating the ability of a manufacturer to shoulder the cost of glassware for a 
retailer would induce business toward those providing this value; as such, the converse is also true for those 
who cannot afford to provide the value). 
100.  See generally CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 25500–25512 (West 2018) (creating numerous 
exceptions to the standard three-tier tied-house system California since 1953). 
101.  See generally CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §25600.05 (enacted by Chapter 623) (providing an 
exception to the laws which prevent a manufacturer giving a thing of value to a retailer specifically for branded, 
advertising items which must be used in a commercial setting). 
102.  See Evan Tarvar, The Economics of Owning a Bar, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 11, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/011216/economics-owning-bar.asp (on file with The 
University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting an average bar can expect to profit approximately $5,000 a 
month if properly managed). 
103.  See Jeffrey Schweers, Bar Owners Cheer New Law Letting Them Receive Free Branded Glassware 
From Distributors, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/2018/10/03/gov-scott-signs-law-letting-bar-owners-get-free-glassware-
finally/1501520002/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that a similar bill 
passed in Florida had a petition of support with over 650 signatures across 200 cities because the law “helps 
keep [retail] overhead low and is good for business”). 
104.  See BUS. & PROF. CODE §25600.05 (enacted by Chapter 623) (prohibiting conditional giving of 
glassware); see also The News Service of Florida, Legislative Battle Brews Over Beer Glasses, TALLAHASSEE 
DEMOCRAT (Mar. 21, 2017) https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/politics/2017/03/21/legislative-battle-
brews-over-beer-glasses/99477770/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting similar 
legislation in Florida is likely to leave bar owners beholden to those manufacturers who provide the benefit of 
free glassware). 
105.  Croxall, supra note 2 (describing the new set of challenges small manufacturers will face when they 
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decisions regarding the products they carry and may lead to tacit agreements.106 It 
is inconsistent with our anti-tied-house system to provide an opportunity to 
establish a relationship between two tiers based on value provided instead of a 
preference in product.107 
Not only is Big Beer more likely to use Chapter 623’s exception, they can do 
so more efficiently than independent breweries.108 Chapter 623’s supporters 
claim the primary reason for the legislation is to “serve beer in their intended 
glassware.”109 In theory, both large and small manufacturers should be able to 
benefit from this opportunity.110 Yet, complications are evident when exploring 
the practical application for a great number of less-established breweries.111 Big 
Beer typically serves many of its traditional products in pint glasses, most 
notably American lagers.112 The pint glass—known for its universality—is also 
one of the most commonly used pieces of glassware in bars.113 Further, a pint 
glass is one of the cheapest pieces a company can purchase as branded 
glassware.114 If recent history applies, Big Beer will choose a pint glass as the 
standard glassware they provide retailers.115 In contrast, craft breweries prefer 
various styles of glassware which allow for various shapes and pour sizes which 
complement their wide range of beers.116 Thus, smaller manufacturers face higher 
 
cannot give the same value to a retailer as those with much stronger financial backing). 
106.  See id. (anticipating a likely formation of informal agreements to continue to purchase a 
manufacturer’s beer based on ability to provide glassware). 
107.  Compare Actmedia, Inc., 830 F.2d at 959 (tied-house laws were passed in part to create distinct tiers 
within the alcohol industry), with Croxall, supra note 2  (reasoning some retailers will be induced to conducting 
business based on the value provided by a manufacturer). 
108.  See Jeffrey Schweers, Local Bar Owners Support Free Alcohol Glassware Bill, TALLAHASSEE 
DEMOCRAT (Apr 3, 2017), https://www.tallahassee.com/story/news/2018/10/03/gov-scott-signs-law-letting-bar-
owners-get-free-glassware (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining large 
manufacturers ability to more efficiently produce a greater volume of glassware compared to independent 
brewers). 
109.  ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 
1133, at 4 (Apr. 3, 2019). 
110.  ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 
1133, at 4 (Apr. 3, 2019) (implying each and every manufacturer, not “brand” is afforded the right to use such 
an opportunity limiting large manufacturers with multiple brands). 
111.  Croxall, supra note 2 (demonstrating some craft brewers would welcome the opportunity to provide 
glassware to a retailer while this practice could put others out of business). 
112.  See Zack Mack You’re Drinking Beer Wrong: 7 Reasons Basic Pint Glasses Suck, THRILLIST (May 
28, 2015), https://www.thrillist.com/drink/nation/pint-glasses-are-bad-for-beer-proper-beer-glassware (on file 
with The University of Pacific Law Review) (examining why pint glasses are popular in bars, they are cheap 
marketing compared to proper glassware). 
113.  Caitlin Hartney, Beer Glassware Guide: Beer Glass Types and Uses, KEGWORKS (May 11, 2017), 
https://www.kegworks.com/blog/beer-glassware-guide-beer-glass-types-uses/ (on file with The University of 
Pacific Law Review). 
114.  Id. 
115.  Id. 
116.  See Mack, supra note 112 (each beer is suggested to be served in a different glass at different 
temperatures to ensure proper taste profile).  
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costs because their glassware selection tends to be larger.117 Manufacturing these 
varieties of craft beer glassware costs at least twice as much as manufacturing 
standard pint glasses.118 To benefit from Chapter 623’s exception, a manufacturer 
will want to distribute as much branded glassware as possible and independent 
brewers simply cannot keep up with their larger counterparts.119Additionally, 
bulk pricing allows Big Beer to pay a significantly lower price per unit for the 
exact same product because the enormous volume they order compared to an 
independent brewery.120 The California Craft Brewers Association voiced 
concern that these simple realities will result in an inability for California’s 
independent breweries to make use of the exception.121 
C. Cost of Enforcement 
The authority responsible for enforcing Chapter 623 is ABC, a California 
state department tasked with the regulation and enforcement of the alcohol 
industry.122 To regulate compliance with the provisions in Chapter 623, ABC 
estimates they will open over 1,400 investigations annually at a cost of nearly 
one million dollars.123 
Last year, the department operated at a deficiency exceeding ten million 
dollars.124 California’s 2019 budget earmarks over fifty million dollars for ABC 
compliance—a significant increase from last year’s allotment of thirty-six—to 
help reduce the deficit.125 Yet this increase in funds will not completely erase the 
deficit because new provisions in the budget require ABC to overhaul the state 
licensing system.126 Of the fourteen-million-dollar increase in this year’s 
 
117.  See Schweers supra note 108 (explaining that bar owners consider the expense of purchasing 
specific glasses for different types of beer prohibitively expensive.) and Hartney, supra note 113 (detailing the 
variety of glassware beer experts would recommend for the specific style of beer which is consumed). 
118.  See DISCOUNT MUGS, https://www.discountmugs.com/category/custom-beer-mugs-and-glasses/ 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noticing pint glasses start 
at $0.52 while tulip and mugs each cost over $2.00 a piece). 
119.  Schweers supra note 108. 
120.  See Pint Glass, DISCOUNT MUGS, https://www.discountmugs.com/product/16-oz.-custom-pint-
glasses/?mode=printed (last visited Aug. 11, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) 
(listing prices for 576-or-more pint glasses at $0.98 each while 10,000 or more is reduced to $0.55 each). 
121.  ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1133, 
at 3 (Apr. 3, 2019). 
122.  See CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 22 (amended 1955) (creating an independent department of the 
executive branch of the state government for the regulation of alcoholic beverage by constitutional amendment). 
123.  ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1133, at 1 (Feb. 21, 
2019). 
124.  Brewer’s Brief: Multi-Year Plan Proposed to Modernize the Department of Alcoholic Beverage 
Control (ABC), CALIFORNIA CRAFT BREWERS ASS’N (2019), available at 
https://www.californiacraftbeer.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Brewer-Brief-ABC-Budget-FINAL.pdf (on 
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review). 
125.  Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 23 (2019) at 137; Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 29 (2018) at 111 
126.  See Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 23 at 137 (noting the text of the annual budget includes provisions 
addressing ABC’s digitization of their process was included in the text of the annual budget). 
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compliance budget, over eight million has been designated for Program 
Performance Improvement Initiative, leaving less than six million to make up for 
a ten-million-dollar deficit.127 
With the government not budgeting for the expense of Chapter 623, it is 
likely that ABC will remain in deficit.128 This budget deficit will either pull 
funding from other essential aspects of the department or require taxpayers to 
make up the difference for the benefit of beer manufacturers.129 This measure 
needlessly complicates matters and fails to create an orderly marketplace free 
from predatory marketing.130 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Chapter 623 blurs the traditional lines of tied-house laws.131 High volume 
manufacturers, like Anheuser-Busch, support the law as a mechanism to 
maximize their market.132 The new law is a clear deviation from the general rule 
which limits a manufacturer to providing a retailer gifts or benefits of 
inconsequential value.133 Governor Jerry Brown articulated a concise and pointed 
rationale for his veto of AB 2573; those words hold true today.134 He warned of 
the effect of providing an opportunity for a limited number of manufacturers who 
could afford to use such a provision.135 He expressed further concern over the 
influence of large manufacturers on retailer business decisions.136 The language 
 
127.  Program Performance Improvement Initiative 2019-20 Budget, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE CONTROL https://www.abc.ca.gov/licensing/license-fees/program-performance-
improvement-initiative-2019-20-budget/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific 
Law Review). 
128.  Cf Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 23 (detailing the annual budget for ABC with special directive for new 
expenses stemming from digitization project); and ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, COMMITTEE 
ANALYSIS OF AB 1133, at 1 (Feb. 21, 2019) (notably missing discussion regarding the means by which the 
estimated cost of $977,000 will be handled), with Brewer’s Brief, CALIFORNIA CRAFT BREWERS, supra note 
124 (reasoning that an increase of $6 million in funding will not satisfy the $10 million deficit while 
simultaneously beginning a digitization project). 
129.  See Bill Whalen, A California Budget That Reflects Plenty Of Dollars—But Less Sense, FORBES 
(Jun. 30, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/billwhalen/2018/06/30/a-california-budget-that-reflects-plenty-of-
dollars-but-less-sense/#1d8d685a4057 (on file with The University of McGeorge Law Review) (noting the 2017 
budget was passed at $183 billion and increased an additional $5 billion within 6 months). 
130.  See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 
1133, at 3 (Apr. 3, 2019) (stating that one of the original rationales of the adoption of California tied-house laws 
was to create an orderly marketplace free of aggressive marketing). 
131.  See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 
1133, at 3 (Apr. 3, 2019) (detailing how tied-house law promotes four aims through clear division of tiers within 
the alcohol industry and how the proposed exception allows for the possibility of both inducement and 
aggressive marketing). 
132.  Croxall, supra note 2. 
133.  See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25600 (West 2018) (forbidding licensees from giving “any 
premium, gift, or free goods in connection with the sale or distribution of any alcoholic beverage”). 
134.  Brown Letter, supra note 8. 
135.  Id. 
136.  Id. 
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in Chapter 623 has not addressed either of these concerns.137 By vetoing a bill 
that all but ensures aggressive marketing by large scale manufacturers, Governor 
Brown showcased a respect for the original intentions of California’s tied-house 
law.138 
Chapter 623 sets another dangerous precedent in the erosion of laws which 
regulate an important, yet problematic industry.139 The author and sponsors of 
Chapter 623 demonstrated a lack of regard for tied-house law—echoed in 
Brown’s veto—by submitting a nearly identical bill the following year.140 
Chapter 623 is confirmation that America’s largest beer manufacturers can buy 
the means required to dominate a market which threatens them.141 The fact 
Chapter 623 uses taxpayer dollars to promote the interests of few at the expense 
of independent brewers exacerbates the problem with this newly enacted 
legislation.142 Tied-house laws sought to create a simple framework which 
eliminated the dangers of vertical and horizontal integration and leaves 
consumers free of aggressive marketing previously utilized by manufacturers.143 
Although unsuccessful last year, the 2019 legislative session saw Chapter 623 
enacted despite it seeming to remain in opposition to both of these purposes.144 
 
137.  See BUS. & PROF. CODE §25600.05 (enacted by Chapter 623) (asking for the same substantive law 
with limited additional procedural elements including a sunset date and a requirement to maintain 3 records). 
138.  Actmedia, Inc., 830 F.2d at 959. 
139.  See Croxall, supra note 4  (noticing the complexities of an industry with so much monetary value 
that demands stringent regulation because the potential to greatly affect the lives of its consumers). 
140.  See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 
1133, at 3 (Apr. 3, 2019) (remarking that last year, the California State Legislature passed a similar bill but 
Governor Brown vetoed the bill, citing concerns regarding the preservation of tied-house laws). 
141.  See MARIN INSTITUTE, BIG BEER DUOPOLY, supra note 14 at 3 (asserting that the “power of the 
duopoly poses great threats to . . . three-tier alcohol regulatory system . . . [Big Beer has] spent tens of millions 
of dollars lobbying” for governmental benefits). 
142.  See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS , COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 1133, at 1 (Feb. 
21, 2019) (explaining the conservative estimate of one million dollars in annual expense from the increase in 
investigations related to Chapter 623), and Croxall, supra note 2 (explaining that a majority of independent 
brewers would be “simply priced out” of a “legalized pay-to-play.”). 
143.  Compare Cal. Beer Wholesalers Ass’n 5 Cal. at 409 (detailing the dual aims of California’s tied-
house laws: eliminate aggressive advertising and prevent industry dominance by creating three distinct and 
independent tiers of manufacturing, distribution, and retail), with Croxall, supra note 2 (explaining the high 
likelihood of business inducement dependent on the furnishing of glassware form a manufacturer to a retailer).  
144.  Compare AB 2573, 2018 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2018) (as passed on Aug. 21, 2018, but not 
enacted) (bearing evidence of the similar substance of AB 2573 with later proposed AB 1133) and Brown 
Letter, supra note 8. (explaining the reasons why Governor Brown chose to veto AB 1133); with Complete Bill 
History of AB 1133, https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB1133 
 (last visited Dec. 18, 2019) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (contrasting the Governor 
Newsom’s approval of AB 1133 with Governor Brown’s veto of AB 2573). 
